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The Black International Conspiracy as Security 
Dispositive in the Netherlands, 1880-1900  
Beatrice de Graaf ∗ 
Abstract: »Die Verschwörung der ‘Schwarzen Internationale’ als Sicherheits-
dispositiv in den Niederlanden, 1880-1900«. In this paper we introduce the 
fight against anarchism at the end of the 19th century as a security dispositive. 
An analysis of the emergence of the dispositive of the Black International con-
spiracy and the rise of new modes of governance in the wake of the fight 
against violent anarchism in the Netherlands is presented as a bottom-up pro-
cess of securitization, enabled by two remarkable episodes of anarchist activi-
ties in the Netherlands in 1894 and 1895-1898. Regional prosecutors and po-
lice commissioners capitalized on this (foreign) anarchist threat to instigate 
large-scale police reforms in terms of bureaucratization, standardization and 
centralization. New technologies of imagination, imported from abroad, helped 
to advance these processes of securitization and modernization.  
Keywords: anarchism, Black International, police modernization, anthropomet-
ric data retention, Bertillonage. 
1.  Introduction  
In this paper we introduce the fight against anarchism at the end of the 19th 
century as a security dispositive.1 The manifestation and imagination of a 
‘Black International’ conspiracy marked an acceleration in time and space, a 
rise of new techniques, scientific methods, perspectives and a political constel-
lation, that led to a heterogeneous assemblage of discursive and material ele-
ments resulting from this new threat perception (cf. De Graaf 2012). We will 
present here an analysis of the emergence of the dispositive of the Black Inter-
national and the rise of new modes of governance in the wake of the fight 
against violent anarchism.  
Anarchist attacks were not merely figments of the imagination, as will be 
elaborated below. But we will argue that after 1880 the police and security 
forces were much better equipped and organized to perceive and identify such a 
                                                             
∗  Beatrice de Graaf, Centre for Terrorism and Counterterrorism, Leiden University, P.O. Box 
13228 / 2501 EE The Hague, Netherlands; B.a.de.graaf@cdh.leidenuniv.nl. 
1  This article has been published in an older version in the Dutch Journal for History, De Graaf 
2012. 
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transnational and evasive phenomenon as an international conspiracy. Tele-
graph, telephone, new communication and transportation connections and 
developments in the field of biometrical data retention enabled Amsterdam 
police officers to exchange information with Russian Ochrana agents about 
Russian anarchists visiting the Netherlands.  
The Netherlands were, admittedly, much less targeted by anarchist activists 
than France, the Russian Empire, Italy, the United States or Germany. No 
heads of state or ministers were smitten. Archival records, however, do reveal a 
number of reports and incidents regarding anarchist violence and visiting anar-
chists from abroad. The Dutch socialist leader Ferdinand Domela Nieuwenhuis 
pointed in his autobiography of 1910 to the spurious contacts he had with (vio-
lent) anarchist comrades from Russia or Germany (Domela Nieuwenhuis 1910, 
365-77). Not much has been written on Dutch experiences with anarchist vio-
lence. Literature on the socialist movement does mention its clashes with anar-
chist ideology and activists, but remains silent on the violent aspects and inter-
national contacts between fugitive dynamitards in the Netherlands and well-
known socialists such as Domela Nieuwenhuis (Charité 1972; Bos 2001; Perry 
1994; Perry 1983; Vliegen 1905/1921; Vliegen 1924-38). Even a recent biog-
raphy on Domela Nieuwenhuis only touches upon his contacts in the anarchist 
scene in passing, and avoids discussing his ambivalent attitude towards politi-
cal violence (Stutje 2012, 327-9). In this paper, some first findings are present-
ed on the struggle against anarchist violence in the Netherlands around the end 
of the 19th century.  
The hypothesis is that this struggle should not merely be described as a reac-
tion to concrete incidents and attacks, but should also be considered an expres-
sion of administrative and political agenda-setting, closely connected to the 
ambition to create a modern, centralized and standardized police force, with 
corresponding mission statements and security ideas. Here, we will use the 
dispositive frame discussed in the introduction to analyze the Black Interna-
tional conspiracy, by using the five conceptual elements mentioned in the in-
troduction (securitizing actors, referent subject, referent object, ICT techniques 
and modes of governance), with an additional final note on the visualization of 
security. We will do so by presenting new material taken from the Dutch Na-
tional Archives on some remarkable instances of anti-anarchist activities in the 
Kingdom of the Netherlands. 
2.  A ‘World-Wide Conspiracy’: Actors & Threat Definition 
The anarchist violence that became manifest between 1880 and 1914 is often 
considered the ‘first wave’ of modern terrorism. In numerous anthologies and 
monographs on the history of terrorism, the Russian narodniki, French nihilists 
and Italian anarchists are identified as representing a ‘Black International’ 
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wave of terrorist violence (Rapoport 2004, 46-73). This global threat of a 
‘Black International’ conspiracy was triggered by individual anarchists, unwit-
tingly assisted by social activists and groups through leaflets and magazines, 
who blew up public sites, targeted heads of state with dynamite or stabbed 
them to death, and threatened to unleash all kinds of destructive actions as 
‘propaganda of the deed’. During the years between 1880 and 1914 over 500 
people were wounded and around 160 persons, mostly high officials and state 
representatives, fell victim to anarchist attacks (leaving Russia aside): amongst 
them Czar Alexander II, King Umberto of Italy, the US President William 
McKinley, three prime ministers, numerous other ministers, police officials and 
politicians. Popular Empress Elisabeth of Austria (‘Sissi’) was stabbed to death 
by the Italian anarchist Luigi Lucheni in 1898. Some also consider the attack 
on the Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand on 28 June 1914 an anarchist at-
tack. 
The ‘world-wide conspiracy’ was the specter invoked by the anarchists in 
their writings to describe their millenarian and apocalyptical utopia (or dysto-
pia) on the one hand and to boost their small number on the other. Anarchists 
operated new, very visible and fearsome technologies of destruction, such as 
dynamite and the automobile, as means of transport and as vehicle-borne im-
provised explosive device avant la lettre (Davis 2007). Anarchist associations 
gratefully exploited new possibilities of communicating and traveling around 
the world much more quickly than before. Western anarchists assisted Russian 
colleagues in their attempts to target the Czar. A Polish anarchist took his cue 
to attack the Czar from a newspaper report on the impending state visit of the 
Russian head of state to France. Russian nihilist Sergey Nechaev seized the 
opportunity of cheaper printing techniques to smuggle, translate and dissemi-
nate his Revolutionary Catechism abroad (Butterworth 2010). His anarchist 
colleague Bakunin issued his handful of disciples with four-digit membership 
cards, to suggest a constituency of thousands of adherents to his World Revolu-
tionary Alliance. And the French League of Nihilists disseminated a leaflet in 
1881, bragging about poisoning hundreds of bourgeois families by dispersing 
toxins into the Paris water supply (idem 181-2).  
Anarchists did in fact conspire and commit attacks. The extent to which they 
inflated these conspiracies by means of the modern media and by playing into 
popular fears was, however, larger than life. The projection of their fantasies of 
destruction and psychological terror was met with similarly outrageous reac-
tions of public and political abhorrence. These reactions were symbolic of a 
new, late 19th-century discourse on (in)security and chaos. A new dispositive 
of security and governance emerged, brought into existence by, among other 
things, new technological inventions and adaptations that were appropriated by 
the anarchists and their opponents alike. 
The specter of the anarchist threat was thus immediately taken over by the 
police and security agencies to frame these disparate incidents and attacks as a 
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real international and homogeneous threat. The ‘conspiracy’ dispositive in-
creasingly became a favorite strategy to frame social problems, to discredit 
socialist opposition and mobilize support for the expansion and professionali-
zation of police and security forces. Conspiracy was a fruit of modernism: it 
combined reactionary fears of chaos and socialism with an over-reliance on and 
faith in technological and managerial progress and engineering. The idea of the 
Black International moreover provided operational clues to the nascent police 
and security centers. Even seemingly harmless meetings, such as completely 
legal gatherings of social democratic parties and associations, could be framed 
as a decoy, concealing deceitful activities and illegal conspiracies to overthrow 
the government.  
A conspiracy is by its nature progressive and exponential: it suggests a dark 
number of participants, a transnational outreach, international targets and a 
widely projected end goal (e.g. world power). Such reasoning naturally legiti-
mizes metastasizing security measures and efforts. Anarchists might have dealt 
the first blow, but police and security forces soon took over, especially those 
operating without any democratic or legal constraints, such as the Czarist secu-
rity agency, the Ochrana. Their activities mirrored their threat perceptions. 
Russian officers and noblemen even established an anti-anarchist conspiracy of 
their own, the so-called ‘Holy Brotherhood’, designed to wage war on the 
anarchists by all means, including terrorist attacks (Butterworth 2011, 177).  
The idea of a Black International as an organized, international and homo-
geneous threat was invigorated by sub-state actors in the police and security 
domain. The rationale of national security led to an unwillingness to establish 
checks and balances in the adoption of the rules governing executive secrecy in 
this regard. The fight against anarchism enhanced the reliance on the Weberian 
rationale for secrecy, namely that bureaucracies seek refuge in secrecy for 
reasons of convenience and of efficiency. Concealment in fact insulated bu-
reaucracies from criticism and interference by the nascent European democra-
cies of the late 19th century; it permitted them to cut corners, apply new, far-
reaching measures and to usurp budgets with no questions being asked (Weber 
1946; Simmel 1906). 
This became especially clear in the case of the fugitive anarchist suspect, 
Baron von Ungern-Sternberg, whose story reads like a 19th-century crime 
novel, but has been constructed based on archival research.  
3.  The Case of Baron von Ungern-Sternberg – The First 
 Terrorist Experience in the Netherlands  
In the Netherlands, the dispositive of the Black International was not predomi-
nant in the Dutch media, but even here, the anarchist threat gave rise to sub-
stantial changes in administrative and political security practices. New technol-
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ogies of imagination entered the Dutch bureaucratic domain, triggering and 
enabling new modes of governance and security measures.  
Due to the rise of financial markets and the diamond industry, cities like 
Amsterdam experienced an economical high after 1871, followed by a corre-
sponding upsurge of urban security and criminality problems. Public disturb-
ances and riots increased, thus putting issues of public order and security high 
on the local and political agenda, advanced by political parties that were found-
ed around that same period (De Rooy et al. 2011, 298-321).2 Regarding these 
security concerns, it was not the anarchists but the organized socialists that 
represented the largest threat to the established order (Charité 1972; Bos 2001). 
Riots and revolts, such as the Amsterdam ‘Eel Revolt’ of 1886, where 26 peo-
ple died after the police tried to suppress a public spectacle, demonstrated that 
local authorities had to deal with new kinds of challenges and tensions (De 
Rooy 1971; Van der Wal 2000, 172-3; Bos 2001, 207-21). Police reports spoke 
of ‘red flags’ and subversive socialists roaming the streets.3 In 1887, a new 
article was added to the constitution, allowing the king to impose martial law 
and to declare a state of emergency ‘in order to maintain external and interna-
tional security’. Civil government would be suspended and military rule would 
be deployed instead, allowing the army to intervene at the king’s command 
(Van Zuijlen 2008, 66).4 This constitutional amendment legalized already 
existing practices of local army interventions at any mayor’s request, thereby 
normalizing and standardizing this instrument of force. In March 1888, it was 
deployed against worker strikes in the northern parts of the country, in the 
Frisian and Groninger turf areas, after the Social Democrat League (Sociaal-
Democratische Bond, SDB) had incited the poorly-paid workers to riot. Ferdi-
nand Domela Nieuwenhuis, the SDB’s notorious leader, was elected into Par-
liament only a few months later. Fear of socialist revolt and violent class strug-
gle subsequently increased (Domela Nieuwenhuis 1910, 99, 122, 132, 442).5  
Violent outbursts were still the exception, but Parliament had nevertheless 
felt the need to prohibit the transport and stockpiling of explosives ‘with mali-
cious intent’ by royal decree in 1885.6 On 5 December 1888, on the occasion of 
the Dutch national celebration of Santa Claus, the mayor, police commander 
                                                             
2  Cf. ‘Een terugblik’, De Nederlandsche Politiegids, 3 (1888), No. 36. 
3  Cf. Amsterdam City Archives, 5225, inv. no. 759, A30532000159, telegram no. 164, bureau 
sectie 5 aan hoofdbureau, 25 July 1886, 7.56 uur namiddag,; A30532000139, telegram no. 
148, bureau sectie 5 aan hoofdbureau, 25 July 1886, 5.50 uur namiddag. With thanks to 
Bernard Bremmer. 
4  <http://www.denederlandsegrondwet.nl/9353000/1/j9vvihlf299q0sr/vi7df7it0ez5>.  
5  F. Domela Nieuwenhuis denies in his autobiography any violent behavior on behalf of the 
Dutch socialists and anarchists; they were no ‘dynamite men’. He discards allegations of this 
nature by minister Heemskerk as ‘mendacious’. However, he does admit his admiration for 
foreign anarchists such as Elysée Reclus and Peter Kropotkin, whose texts he translated in 
1885. 
6  Koninklijk Besluit (Royal Decree), 15 October 1885, Staatsblad , No. 187. 
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and public prosecutor of Amsterdam received ‘hellish machines’ – explosive 
devices, intended to blow up after they were unwrapped. The true content of 
the surprise packages was, however, detected before they exploded.7 From the 
archives, it becomes clear that itinerant anarchists remained a threat in the 
years that followed. Police commissioners declared their worries over socialist 
meetings usurped by anarchists, or misused to mobilize workers to riot. They 
reported on ‘strangers’ within their area, purportedly preparing all kinds of 
subversive activities. Generally, local police officers would take care of such 
threats on their own, together with the mayor and the local authorities. The 
Ministry of Justice would only be alerted in case of urgent prosecutorial rele-
vance. However, according to local and regional police commissioners and 
public prosecutors, anarchism was now reaching a stage of national urgency.8 
The year 1894 became a decisive point in the development of anti-anarchist 
activities, both in Western Europe and in the Netherlands. On February 22, the 
French anarchist Emile Henry carried out an attack on the café Terminus in 
Paris, killing five citizens. His trial commenced two months later, triggering a 
series of solidarity actions by fellow anarchists all over Europe. Even in the 
United States, demonstrations on Henry’s behalf were organized. In the mining 
town of Liège in Belgium, where recent mine accidents had fuelled unrest 
amongst the coal workers, anarchists seized their opportunity. On 1 May 1894 
a heavy bomb blew up the Saint Jacob Church in the city centre, followed by 
another heavy explosion two days later. The second attack severely wounded 
the local G. P. Renson, although it had been intended for the local court presi-
dent who went by the same name; the anarchists had deposited their explosives 
at the wrong address. The perpetrators were caught a few days later, only for 
the police to discover that they had been lured and paid by a stranger, who had 
moved into town a few months earlier and who travelled under the name of 
Baron Ernest von Ungern-Sternberg. 
The investigating judge issued a warrant order and sent out pictures and per-
sonal description of the suspected baron.9 Von Ungern, however, managed to 
escape to the Netherlands, very conveniently leaving a note in his hotel room 
with the names of eight Germans, two Dutchmen and two Belgians who had 
allegedly assisted him in his activities (Butterworth 2010, 338-45).10 The Bel-
gian prosecutor informed his Dutch colleagues about the investigations. On 31 
May, the prosecutor of Den Bosch, ‘jonkheer’ (squire) Theodore Serraris, 
notified the minister of justice, W. van der Kaay, that the suspected perpetrator 
                                                             
7  ‘Uit de Hoofdstad’, in: De Nederlandsche Politiegids, Vol. 3 (1888), No. 37. 
8  National Archive, The Hague/Netherlands (NA), pl.no. 2.09.05, inv.no. 6486, file No. 8, Letter 
from the Public Prosecutor of Amsterdam to the Minister of Justice, 14 June 1894. 
9  NA, pl.no. 2.09.05, inv.no. 6486, Cabinet du Juge d’Instruction/Arrondissement de Liège, 
‘Signalement et Portrait’, Luik, 20 May 1894. 
10  Butterworth did not conduct research in the Netherlands and does not mention the Von 
Sternberg affair. 
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of an anarchist attack, one ‘Ungern von Sternberg’, had fled to Maastricht and 
had “repeatedly met with the notorious and very dangerous socialist Vliegen, 
publisher and printer of De Volkstribuun [people’s tribune],” a socialist maga-
zine.11 Willem Vliegen was a well-known propagandist and typographer in 
Maastricht and would become co-founder of the Dutch Social Democratic 
Party, the SDAP, later in August that year. Serraris received permission to put 
Vliegen under surveillance and to interrogate him and his socialist comrades 
(Perry 1994; De Jonge 1979).  
Von Ungern-Sternberg had in the meantime found refuge at the Russian 
consulate, which was not as suprising as it might seem, since the fake baron 
was an agent of the Russian secret police, the Ochrana. And his real name was 
Cyprien Jagolkovsky. He worked under instructions from his superior Rach-
kovsky, who operated from the Russian embassy in Paris and had organized a 
series of anarchist attacks in western capitals, to reinforce suspicions of an 
international anarchist conspiracy. Commissioned by the Ochrana, Jagolkovsky 
had paid a number of European anarchists to commit attacks, with the Liège 
bombings being one of the most successful operations. At the Dutch consulate, 
Jagolkovsky however ran into probably the only Russian diplomat who was not 
involved in the Ochrana conspiracy and did not want to condone it either, once 
Jagolkovsky informed him of his true nature. He did not want to protect the 
agent provocateur and reported him to the Amsterdam police. There, police 
officials had already discovered that the anarchist suspect was not a member of 
the respectable Baltic aristocratic family Von Unger-Sternberg. Jagolkovsky 
had, however, escaped once again, and fled back to his mother country (But-
terworth 2010, 342). 
The exact details of the Ochrana plot were not clear at that time. Only in 
January 1895, during the trial against Von Ungern-Sternberg’s Belgian accom-
plices, did vague rumors regarding a possible sting operation surface. The 
renowned head of the Amsterdam criminal investigation, Christiaan Batelt, 
testified that the ‘fake baron’ had intermittently lived with the anarchist Guérin 
under the name Stein and had reported himself to the Russian consul as a ‘se-
cret agent’.12 The consul, however, refused to appear in court to testify and 
Russia refused to extradite Jagolkovsky or respond to the allegations.13 
The affair had severe consequences for the Dutch socialists. By the efforts 
of Serraris and his fellow prosecutors, they were immediately implicated in the 
perceived threat of anarchist violence. One of the two Dutchmen mentioned in 
                                                             
11  NA, Archive Ministry of Justice 1876-1914, pl. no. 2.09.05, inv. no. 6486, file no. 2, 4 June 
1894, Letters from Serraris to the Minister of Justice, 31 May 1894 and 2 June 1894. 
12  Batelt (1846-1919) had established a photographic service within the Amsterdam police 
force in 1883 and was a renowned expert in forensic and investigative matters. 
13  Zie: ‘België’, De Baanbreker, 5 January 1895, vol. 58; De Baanbreker, 26 January 1895, vol. 
61. 
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Von Sternberg’s note was Vliegen. Von Sternberg had indeed visited him three 
times between 29 April and 2 May (just before and after the attacks). Accord-
ing to the police, Vliegen and someone called ‘Pieters’ were “dangerous indi-
viduals”, who were in “in close contact with their Belgian party colleagues” 
and were suspected of “importing dynamite from Belgium”.14 The police as-
sumed that Von Sternberg had printed his ‘threatening manifests’ at Vliegen’s 
office, and repeatedly searched his private and company address. A letter by 
Von Sternberg was found, of which Vliegen vehemently denied any 
knowledge, asserting that “Sternberg, who visited him three times, had planted 
the letter on him to make him unhappy” (a quite realistic assumption). Apart 
from Vliegen and Pieters, the judicial authorities also held other socialists 
under surveillance who were allegedly part of the anarchist conspiracy. In this 
manner, the purported plot was extended progressively. Prosecutors travelled 
between Maastricht, Liège, Brussels and Amsterdam, harassing their socialist 
suspects.15  
Here, the Ochrana had at least achieved some success: For Serraris, the Von 
Ungern case was a very welcome opportunity to lobby for more security 
measures and to convince the minister of justice of the purported anarchist 
threat. Other prosecutors came to his assistance as well. The prosecutor of The 
Hague reported the retrieval of a recipe for the making of a nitroglycerine 
bomb in May 1894, via a ‘secret informer’ within anarchist circles.16 Another 
prosecutor informed the minister about a box with dynamite, located in a train 
wagon coming in from Germany.17 Both findings proved harmless (the recipe 
did not work and the purported dynamite turned out to be a hoax), but never-
theless inspired the pyrotechnical department of the War cabinet to draft a 
manual “to deal with hellish machines.”18  
4.  The Queen on Tour – New Impulses for the 
 Antiterrorist Dispositive in 1895 
This episode spilled over into the next year 1895, when Queen Regent Emma 
von Waldeck and Pyrmont took her daughter, crown princess Wilhelmina, on a 
                                                             
14  NA, pl.no. 2.09.05, inv.no. 6486, file no. 7, Serraris to the minister, 11 June 1894, Den Bosch. 
15  NA, pl. no. 2.09.05, inv.no. 6486, file no. 2, Serraris to the minister, 2 June 1894, Den Bosch; 
file no. 9, letter Serraris, 14 June 1894. 
16  NA, pl.no. 2.09.05, inv.no. 6486, file no. 10, exchange between the regional police and the 
Minister of Justice, May 22 - June 13, 1894. 
17  NA, pl.no. 2.09.05, inv.no. 6486, file no. 25, letter from the Amsterdam Prosecutor General 
to the Minister of Justice, 20 July 1894; Letter from the Public Prosecutor of Haarlem to the 
minister, 27 July 1894. 
18  NA, pl.no. 2.09.05, inv.no. 6442, no. D36, letter from the Minister of Justice to the Minister 
of War, 3 August 1894. With thanks to Jos Smeets. 
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number of high-profile city visits to warm the restless and rioting population of 
the southern, predominantly Catholic parts of the country towards the 
(Protestant) house of Orange. With the murder of the French prime minister in 
1894 in his mind, the zealous prosecutor from the south, Theodore Serraris, 
was wary of anarchist attacks; a fear worsened by the steady influx of anarchist 
fugitives from France who were on the run from the increasingly repressive 
measures in their home country.19 The Von Ungern-Sternberg affair exacerbat-
ed suspicions about the involvement of well-known Dutch social democrats in 
international anarchist conspiracies.  
In May 1895, the regent Emma and 14-year old princess Wilhelmina em-
barked on their first railroad trip. The tour induced a number of new security 
arrangements, most notably a special security escort, intended to deter and to 
fend off socialists and anarchists. The regent, however, admonished them not to 
“resort into a brute show of force towards a public expressing its warm senti-
ments for the Royal Family, or, regarding a foreign head of state, its interest in 
this head of state’s personality.” 20 On May 15 and 16, the royal pair visited the 
city of Den Bosch. Mayor Van der Does de Willebois, wary of anarchists and 
socialists, summoned plain-clothed detectives to patrol as journalists amongst 
the onlookers (Biemans 2007). On May 25, the royal party went further to 
Tilburg, the largest city of the province of Brabant, and from there to Maas-
tricht. Regarding the high-profile security risks involved, prosecutor Serraris 
tried to sack socialist railway employees in advance and raided socialist head-
quarters once again. Soon afterwards, Vliegen’s printing company went down 
in flames, under suspect circumstances.21 In preparation of her majesty’s visit 
to the South, the minister of justice moreover put anarchists in the Netherlands, 
Belgium and Germany under surveillance, in cooperation with the Prussian and 
Belgian authorities. Two Prussian and four Belgian secret agents were added to 
the team of Dutch investigating officers during this royal summer.22  
These concrete measures aside, the Dutch minister of justice remained reluc-
tant to adopt new laws similar to the French, Russian or Prussian ones. He kept 
to his liberal position and fended off both his prosecutor Serraris and the Prus-
sian envoy, who demanded stricter laws. In December 1895, the Prussian en-
voy sent a request, asking the minister to adopt laws against dissemination and 
glorification of socialist and anarchist standpoints by meetings, writings or 
                                                             
19  Letter from Prosecutor General Serraris to the minister, 11 May 1895. Ministry of Justice, 
invno. 2.09.05, no. 6487. NA.  
20  Decree, signed by the Minister of War and Her Majesty Wilhelmina, 28 February 1895, file 
no. 27; letter from the Minister of Justice to the Prosecutor General of Den Bosch, 5 April 
1895, file no. 3. Pl.no. 2.09.05, inv.no. 6487, NA. 
21  NA, pl.no. 2.09.05, inv.no. 6487, file no. 9, exchange between the Minister of Foreign Affairs 
and the Prosecutor General of Den Bosch, 18 May 1895; file no. 3, exchange between the 
Minister of Justice and the Prosecutor General of Den Bosch, 4 June 1895. 
22  NA, pl.no. 2.09.05, inv.no. 6487, file no. 12, Serraris to the minister, 17 June 1895. 
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other means. According to the Prussian police, Dutch socialists and anarchists, 
who enjoyed free rein in publishing and disseminating their riotous ideas in the 
Netherlands, also ventured into neighboring Germany, thereby causing “the 
security of […] friendly states to be endangered, and public order and quiet to 
be disrupted”. Minister Van der Kaay, however, was not susceptible to this 
demand for solidarity. Socialist “dissemination has taken place freely for years 
now, by virtue of the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of speech for anyone 
to ventilate his ideas.” The minister did not see any merit in “cultivating mar-
tyrs” or “sowing the seed of resentment” amongst the social democrats, thereby 
“nourishing that party”.  
Experience taught us the efficacy of this line of conduct, because it stands 
without doubt that social democrat turmoils in the Netherlands have not mere-
ly waned both in numbers and relevance for some years now, but the influence 
of their leaders on the population has decreased considerably as well, and in-
terest in the movement itself is gradually declining.23  
According to the minister, incidental measures were one thing, but ordering 
large-scale repressive laws something else altogether. Compared with Germa-
ny, socialism was on the retreat in the Netherlands, thus, ignoring them and not 
providing them with more frameworks of injustice seemed the most effective 
approach.  
To be sure, the minister was no free spirit but a staunch liberal conservative. 
He acquiesced in stepping up surveillance measures, deploying plain-clothed 
detectives at border towns and stations, keeping socialists and anarchists under 
control and ordering all aliens to report within 24 hours of their arrival in the 
Netherlands. A number of foreigners were immediately expelled as a result. 
Compared to other countries, the fight against the Black International in the 
Netherlands was a second-tier dispositive, but it still did trigger public attention 
and morphed into new techniques of dealing with foreigners and socialists after 
1894.  
5.  Public Morality under Attack: The Referent Object 
 Expands 
In most European countries, the projected anarchist threat was legitimized by 
pointing to the values at stake. Not only official representatives but urban life 
as such, public norms and values were perceived as being threatened. These 
ideas went hand in glove with the shift in security objectives in late 19th-
century Europe. The liberal vision of a rather marginal notion of state security 
                                                             
23  NA, pl.no. 2.09.05, inv.no. 6488, file no. 6, 8 January 1896, exchange between the Minister 
of Justice, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the German envoy, 18 December 1895. 
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gave way to maximalist and very modernist concepts of public order and public 
security for the state, its authorities and the population. Security, in the broad-
est sense of the word, became an ordering principle in society; general safety 
and security measures served to promote nationalist and moral values (Te 
Velde 1992, 205). The dispositive of the Black International served these pur-
poses. Anarchists not only threatened the lives of monarchs and presidents, but 
disrupted daily life, economic business and undermined the public spirit and 
moral order. The expansion of the ‘referent object’ of the anarchist threat thus 
mirrored the expanding projecting of the conspiring circles. 
Parallel to the rise of socialism, mechanisms of control and the hold over 
society by security measures grew stronger. Article 3 of the new constitution of 
1887 commanded the government to offer protection to goods, traffic and per-
sons within the Dutch territory. For the liberals in parliament, this new empha-
sis on “the concern for the peace and security of the state” marked the begin-
ning of a new regime of preventative and regulating security considerations. 
Security policy was made subject to the ordering principles of nationalism, 
liberalism and public decency. For Dutch standards, an unprecedented amount 
of new laws, measures and administrative practices were developed, especially 
in the security domain (Te Velde 1992, 205).  
Compared to other European countries this expansion was kept in rein, part-
ly by the lack of successful attacks (no lethal anarchist attacks took place), and 
partly by other considerations of a more liberal, economical or even historical 
kind. Dutch representatives and commentators reminded their audiences, for 
example, of the consequences of a repressive haute police, when the Dutch 
suffered “under Napoleon’s iron rod and multiple spies”.24 Until late in the 19th 
century, the overriding ideas on police activities pertained to a rather passive 
and reactive maintenance of public order and peace. The socialist movement 
and the industrial proletariat were less developed and counted fewer members 
than elsewhere in Europe. Central security agencies similar to those in the 
Austrian empire, Prussia or France did not exist in the Netherlands.  
However, even considering this relatively low profile on security matters, 
the anarchists’ objectives and society’s vulnerability were extended considera-
bly after 1894. An influential police journal wrote about “attacks against public 
morality”, inspired by the “revolt against authority”, enabled and disseminated 
through “the media”.25 This expansion of the referent object inevitably dictated 
the corresponding countering logics and measures. Serraris received permission 
to appoint “secret police officers”, “familiar with the French and German lan-
guages and trained to monitor the activities and intentions of the many social 
democrats and anarchists that lived or temporarily stayed in that area, amongst 
                                                             
24  ‘Geheime Uitgaven’, I, II, in: De Nederlandsche Politiegids, vol. 5 (1890), no. 51, 52. 
25  ‘Schadelijke openbaarmaking van misdrijven’, in: De Nederlandsche Politiegids, vol. 9 
(December 1894), no. 108. 
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them numerous Belgians and Germans”.26 This measure granted Serraris vast 
opportunities to investigate, monitor and register any foreigner he deemed 
suspect. 
 Since the attacks in Belgium and France, especially after the murder of 
Prime Minister Sadi Carnot by Italian anarchist Sante Caserio on 25 June 1894, 
public awareness, both in the media and in society, of ‘dangerous individuals’ 
and ‘strange chaps’ had increased.27 “Spring and summer have seen plenty of 
shocking incidents inside and outside our borders,” De Nederlandsche Poli-
tiegids warned its readers. “Dynamiters don’t need to correspond with each 
other; they leave that to the press, in the full knowledge that this queen of the 
earth has irresistible means at her disposal to make them heard and seen.”28 
According to the Politiegids, the dynamitards were not only after public and 
political dignitaries, but were subverting the overall public and moral order: 
“And our country? […] Then a number of shocking attacks against public 
morality occurred. However different they might be, it seemed as if they were 
connected by a single thread.” This ‘thread’ consisted of a revolt against au-
thority as such, and the abuse of the media to glorify such immoral deeds.29  
To state a situation of moral panic would be an exaggeration of public 
knowledge and the dissemination of newspapers within the population at that 
time. However, alarmed by newspaper stories, a number of perceptive citizens 
felt the urge to report the sight of suspicious-looking strangers to the police. A 
medical doctor in Amsterdam remembered having treated the suspected Baron 
Von Ungern-Sternberg in his office on 15 March 1894.30 In July 1894, the 
minister of justice received a number of reports on two ‘suspicious Spaniards’ 
who had been spotted in a ‘coffee house’, discussing plans to attack the heads 
of state in Spain. The police was keen to follow up on these reports; warrants 
were issued, and wanted descriptions were spread. Through the Foreign Office, 
the implicated countries were informed as well, leading to personal expressions 
of gratitude by the Spanish crown in this instance.31 The Ministry of Justice 
moreover received numerous requests for extradition or description from Rus-
sia, Belgium and Germany and generally tried to meet these demands dutifully. 
The post and telegraph offices enabled a quick exchange of letters. 
                                                             
26  NA, pl.no. 2.09.05, inv.no. 6486, file no. 22. Exchange between the Minister of Justice and 
the Prosecutor General of Amsterdam, 25 September 1894. 
27  Cf. Anarchist 7, 21 July 1894, no. 62; ‘Aanranding van ’t Gezag’, De Nederlandsche Poli-
tiegids 9, July 1894, no. 103. 
28  ‘Schadelijke openbaarmaking van misdrijven’, De Nederlandsche Politiegids 9, December 
1894, no. 108. 
29  Ibidem. 
30  NA, pl.no. 2.09.05, inv.no. 6486, file no. 4, letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs (FA) to 
the Minister of Justice, 29 June 1894, including the medical doctor’s report; Idem, 16 July 
1894. 
31  NA, pl.no. 2.09.05, inv.no. 6486, file no. 19, letter from the Minister of Justice to the FA, 6 
July 1894; Envoy Madrid to FA, 21 July 1894. 
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In general, oversight on foreigners was intensified. Regional prosecutors re-
ported the number of ‘strangers’ in their area to the minister on a regular ba-
sis.32 If such a foreigner was caught without a license, explaining and legitimiz-
ing his residence in the country, he was immediately deported abroad. The fear 
of the anarchist stranger thus prompted all kinds of measures, justified by the 
prosecutors with reference to the threat of an anarchist attack in the Nether-
lands.  
Society’s vulnerability to subversion was accentuated, not only by subver-
sive acts of violence, but also by subversive thoughts. On 24 January 1895, 
Serraris sent a number of proposals to the minister suggesting criminalizing 
insults and incitement and introducing censorship on the media. 
I for one do not share the views of those who are in favor of allowing that par-
ty [the social democrat party, BdG] free rein, of letting that illness “drive itself 
out” – thus applying the old “laissez faire, laissez passer” rule to it as well’. 
The media in particular were to blame: ‘The press has been the most powerful 
weapon wielded by the socialists for propaganda purposes so far […] There 
are those who would like to have the newspaper tax reintroduced.33 
This attempt at criminalizing the whole of the social movement was a bridge 
too far to the liking of the minister. “Each case has to be judged on its own” 
Minister Van der Kaay (still a classical liberal) scribbled in the margin of Ser-
raris’ notes. The policy of leniency and indulgence had “been applied success-
fully in the northern provinces. Precisely because we have let them get on with 
it, the meetings of these associations [the socialist and anarchist, BdG] are only 
being attended by a handful of young men.” Although the minister still felt that 
constitutional rights should not be infringed upon generically, he started to 
move in Serraris’ direction. He admitted that the Criminal Code could profit 
from one amendment or another. In particular, Serraris’ proposals for heavier 
punishment for insulting authorities spoke to the minister. In December 1894, 
he issued a ban on the Social Democrat League. The times were indeed chang-
ing.34  
6.  The Emergence of New ICT Techniques 
Without the rise of new information, communication and transport methods 
(ICT), it would have been very hard for the anarchist threat to be securitized as 
                                                             
32  Cf. NA, pl.no. 2.09.05, inv.no. 6486, Fourth quarterly report by the Prosecutor General in 
Leeuwarden to the Minister of Justice, 19 January 1893, p. 12-13. 
33  NA, pl.no. 2.09.05, inv.no. 6487, file no. 18, Serraris to Minister of Justice (with notes from 
the minister), 24 January 1895. 
34  The Social Democrat League (SDB) was dissolved but reestablished and continued under the 
name Socialist League. 
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a world-wide conspiracy (the Black International) at all. Anarchists published 
their threats in newspapers, traveled by steamships and contacted each other by 
telegraph. Newspapers connected strikes, workers’ riots and communist meet-
ings to attacks by Russian nihilists and French anarchists. Incidents in Europe, 
Australia and the United States were related to attacks in Egypt, China and 
Japan. Fear soared high; in 1898 the German emperor Wilhelm II cancelled a 
state visit to Egypt because of rumors about Italian anarchists conspiring to 
attack him there. The global threat of the Black International played into the 
vignette of the “new political era, experimental, positive, scientific” (Butter-
worth 2010, 46). The downside to the era of enormous progress and positivist 
faith in science and technology was the idea that villains would be able to de-
ploy these scientific findings as well – to their own malicious intents.  
At the same time, new modes of transport, telecommunication and techno-
logical means also played into the hands of the police forces, who were now 
able to ‘connect the dots’ and frame the incidents into one looming specter of 
the anarchist Black International – a specter that was never substantiated by 
evidence, only evoked in the minds and fantasies of the contemporaries. One 
brilliant example of such imagination can be found in G.K. Chesterton’s novel 
The Man Who Was Thursday from 1908, in which the high council of anar-
chists in the end turns out to be set up by Scotland Yard. Good and evil over-
lapped, “so that each man fighting for order may be as brave and good a man as 
the dynamiter. [...] We have descended into hell” (Chesterton 2008[1908], 172-
3).  
Police forces in Europe joined forces and implemented the system of Bertil-
lonage, developed around 1882 by the French police prefect Alphonse Bertil-
lon. So-called portraits parlés registered a series of bio-anthropological facial 
and bodily traits and measures, based on a system of numbers and codes. This 
‘scientific’ method was informed by the notion that a deviational, criminal 
nature manifested itself in facial features and other anthropometric characteris-
tics. The system of Bertillonage went hand in glove with the social Darwinist 
and eugenic ideas on criminal degeneration as a genetic phenomenon. It had 
the advantage that it systematized crime-scene photography and developed a 
standardized identification system based on physical measurements. This an-
thropometrical data could be transmitted at short notice to fellow police forces 
abroad, in order to identify and arrest fugitive criminals or suspects – which 
was something of a revolution, at least on paper, since most of the suspects had 
still managed to keep their identity hidden until that time, or were able to es-
cape with forged identity cards. New shipping lines and railroad connections 
furthermore enabled the photographs taken to be dispatched in a much quicker 
pace as well (Fijnaut 2007, 283; Jäger 2006, 196-221).  
The operational techniques of Bertillonage, the metric photography and the 
international warrant posters not only served to identify suspects or to improve 
prosecution, but they also symbolized the state of modernity to which national 
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security forces aspired. Within the context of increasing bilateral and transna-
tional cooperation, these modern applications were a ticket to the circle of the – 
supposedly – most advanced and professionalized forces. Hence, police forces 
in the Netherlands also pressed their minister to tune into the new scientific 
insights and international developments. The Bertillonage system had already 
been adopted in France, and subsequently conquered Germany and the United 
Kingdom (Lignian 1894, 987-96). Due to the ambitious police commissioner of 
Rotterdam, Willem Voormolen, the system also gained a foothold in the Neth-
erlands. In February 1896, the Parisian police officer was invited to the Nether-
lands and received a royal decoration, together with Voormolen himself, from 
the Dutch queen regent Emma.35 By royal decree, the Bertillon system was now 
also applied within the Dutch police and judicial forces.36  
In this fashion, the Department of Justice embraced ‘modern’ scientific in-
sights from the young discipline of criminology and thus signaled its attempt to 
professionalize and centralize the Dutch police system. A central system of 
registration was adopted, and in the following years a central investigative 
force was created and new detectives were trained. Although no new anarchist 
incident was reported after 1898, the new measures were still legitimized by 
pointing to the necessity of infiltrating the anarchist movement and the preven-
tion of attacks. These reforms and novelties lifted the Dutch police to the status 
of international players. Dutch police forces and the newly constituted criminal 
investigators went along in collecting material on suspect anarchists, exchang-
ing details and photographs with colleagues over the world, including col-
leagues from authoritarian police forces such as the Ochrana.  
International collaboration between European police forces, including the 
Dutch, profited from these trends in bureaucratization and professionalization – 
in compliance with Mathieu Deflem’s hypothesis on the close connection be-
tween more autonomy in terms of bureaucratization and professionalization 
and more international contacts (Deflem 2002). This internationalization was 
cemented in 1898, when the first international anti-anarchist conference was 
organized, three weeks after the murder of Empress Elisabeth. Here, participat-
ing states agreed on a definition of anarchist crimes, accepted the system of 
Bertillonage internationally, promised to assist each other with rendition and 
information requests, and declared that they would implement the death penal-
ty. Not all countries ratified the treaty, but the meeting heralded the beginning 
                                                             
35  ‘Het Bertillonage-stelsel’, De Nederlandsche Politiegids 10, May 1895, no. 113; NA, pl.no. 
2.09.05, inv.no. 6488, exchange between the Minister of Justice, the FA and the Cabinet of 
the Queen Regent, 22 January 1896, no. 12; 12 February, no. 5; 15 February, no. 7; 19 Feb-
ruary no. 11. 
36  KB, Staatsblad, 22 February 1896. Cf. ‘Antropometrisch stelsel’, Nieuws van de Dag, 3 Janua-
ry 1896. 
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of organized international police cooperation and can be seen as the forerunner 
of Interpol (Fijnaut 2007, 283; Jäger 2006, 196-221).  
The system of Bertillonage soon gave way to the British invention of dacty-
loscopy, but the idea was the same. Without these international communication 
possibilities, police agencies from Amsterdam to Moscow would not have been 
able to invoke and identify an internationally defined, purported global anar-
chist network. Although in reality not many anarchists were caught by these 
systems, they served to centralize, professionalize and standardize police ap-
proaches and heralded new, modernized security regimes throughout Europe 
(De Graaf 2012). 
In 1903, Voormolen made another study trip to London, Paris and Berlin, to 
sustain bilateral cooperation on fighting anarchism and to learn more about 
new theories on ‘errant villains’, radicals and anarchists operating ‘hellish 
machines’. From London Voormolen brought back the technique of dactylo-
scopy, again single-handedly modernizing the Dutch police force. He also 
reported proudly on his exchange with Prussian colleagues, to whom he had 
been able to present new anarchist photographs: 300 to the Dresden Police and 
91 to his Berlin colleagues.37 The conspiracy dispositive thus both thrived on 
and legitimized the rise and implementation of new ICT techniques.  
7.  The Rise of New Governance Techniques  
The technology that enabled police and justice forces on a global scale to iden-
tify, exchange and disseminate their threat perception also fed into the creation 
of new modes of international cooperation and the establishment of formal 
measures of international exchange of anarchist identities between police and 
judicial services.  
As we already noted, not only the anarchists were duped by these tech-
niques. The new technological devices were especially geared to register, iden-
tify and disseminate suspect aliens as such. Notification orders, surveillance 
measures and border checks followed from that. Even in the Netherlands, 
where no new laws infringing on freedom of speech were adopted, executive 
power expanded into new police and investigative centers. Both the Von Stern-
berg affair in 1894 and – even more so – the royal tour to the southern part of 
the country in 1895 opened a window of opportunity for new modes of govern-
ance.  
Inspired by police reforms in the United Kingdom, public prosecutors and 
police commissioners initiated a transformation in law enforcement and securi-
                                                             
37  NA, pl.no. 2.09.05, inv.no. 6514, file 2 October 1905, no. 7, Report by Voormolen to the 
Minister of Justice, 30 September 1903. 
HSR 38 (2013) 1  │  158 
ty thinking: attention shifted from repression to prevention, and from reactive 
‘crime fighting’ to proactive control of public life and order – to the extent that 
some scholars even speak of the emergence of a “social intervention state” (De 
Rooy 1979). Especially the chief police commissioners in the main capitals of 
the Netherlands were active in pushing forward these developments (Meer-
shoek 2006, 106). Rotterdam’s commissioner Voormolen went on tour to vari-
ous cities abroad, to study how other police forces coped with new trends in 
crime and security management. In 1898, he established the Fellowship of 
Chief Commissioners and Commissioners of the Netherlands Police Forces, in 
order to better calibrate and coordinate organization and methods of the judicial 
police throughout the country and to build a lobby for modernization. For the 
first meeting, he invited experts from abroad to report on their findings and 
share their experiences (Smeets 2011, 96-7). Such meetings indeed contributed 
to a broader proliferation of the new attitudes and ideas on the mission and aim 
of the police forces.  
The modes of governance correspondingly changed: Concern about vagran-
cy and begging and attention towards misfits, outsiders and marginal figures 
disrupting public order and quiet gave way to a preventative regulation of that 
order on the base of risk calculation measures (Meershoek 2006, 114-20; 
Smeets 2011, 44-8), such as the deployment of plain-clothed detectives at 
border stations or at ‘hot spots’, surveillance of anarchists and the registration 
of foreigners. The Marechaussee (Royal Dutch Constabulary) was tasked with 
maintaining public order, law enforcement, and safeguarding the main roads in 
small municipalities and in the southern provinces of Limburg and North Bra-
bant. Although militarily organized, the Marechaussee was part of the national 
police (rijkspolitie) and was tasked to patrol in border towns and during festivi-
ties, if necessary also in disguise, to identify suspect strangers. For criminal 
investigators and detectives, a higher level of education became obligatory. In 
1896, parliament decided to establish a ‘Secret Police Force’ (korps geheime 
politie), and in March 1897, the first federal police investigators were appoint-
ed: trained and tasked to carry out professional prosecution and investigation 
duties, equipped with special investigative means, and embedded within the 
Office of the Public Prosecution (Smeets 2011, 30-5; Van de Bunt and Niemei-
jer 1997). Prosecution of socialists and anarchists tripled (cf. Heering 1994, 
37). 
The coronation of Royal Princess Wilhelmina, on 31 August 1898, gave rise 
to additional concerns and corresponding measures. When prosecutors and 
commissioners suggested the adoption of a new law, regulating the supervision 
of foreigners, anarchists and other potentially dangerous individuals, enough 
public and political support had accrued. A parliamentary committee (the 
‘Commission-Kist’), established in 1898, publicly and officially proclaimed 
anarchism a danger to the public order. The committee, set up by the liberal 
minister of justice Cort van der Linden, was tasked to investigate law enforce-
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ment improvements and police reforms. The threat of anarchism was explicitly 
used as an argument in favor of restructuring the national police organization: 
“out of concern for society, regarding anarchist movements and attacks, that 
not only threaten the state but also target society as a whole”, a nationalized 
and centralized police force was necessary, according to the committee.38 Only 
such a professional and national police force would be able to fend off the most 
important threats to national security: anarchism (from within and outside the 
Netherlands), foreigners, revolutionaries of other dangerous groups, threats to 
the Royal Family (Smeets 2006, 106).39  
The committee thus not only expanded the referent subject of the threat, it 
also inflated the referent object: the assumed targets being threatened ranged 
from the Royal Family to the social fabric as such. Although the organizational 
and administrative conclusions on large-scale police reforms were not adopted, 
the framing of the threat was accepted and reiterated in parliamentary debate 
and in the media. Hence, the imagination of the anarchist threat and alarmist 
language were now infused in the parliamentary-political discourse – and no 
longer confined to behind-the-scenes deliberations within the police and judici-
ary bureaucracies. 
Even the Pierson Administration, known for its commitment to advancing 
social justice, embraced the new security considerations. Liberal Minister of 
Justice Pieter Cort van der Linden suggested expanding article 131 (criminal 
incitement) with the sentence “incitement to disobey legally issued administra-
tive orders, to disobey legal prescriptions, to violently subvert public order”, 
because “in the face of the most dangerous incitement, intended to overthrow 
the existing social order, the authorities more often than not are helpless”. He 
also advocated the introduction of a new article 266, intended to further restrict 
freedom of speech, turning the Netherlands – in the words of socialist leader 
Domela Nieuwenhuis – into “another Mecklenburg-Russia”. Until that time, 
leveling criticisms at the authorities had been admissible; only insults towards 
concrete individuals were penalized. That freedom would now be restricted, 
according to the minister (cf. Domela Nieuwenhuis 1910, 491).40  
With these new declarations and legal securitizations, the struggle against 
anarchism gained much more public and political salience. In 1900, the nation-
al Police Magazine (Politiegids) first referred to the existence of a Black Inter-
national, quoting some phrases from the French Journal des Débats:  
                                                             
38  Commissie-Kist, Verslag der commissie door den minister van Justitie benoemd om advies 
uit te brengen nopens de maatregelen welke tot verbetering van de politie kunnen strekken 
(The Hague 1901), chapter 1. Cited at Fijnaut 2007: 325. 
39  NA, pl.no. 2.09.05, inv.no. 3004, letter from the Minister of Justice to Kist, Franken and 
Voormolen, 6 October 1898, no. 113; ‘De Politie en ’t Anarchisme’, De Nederlandsche Poli-
tiegids, 15, September 1900, no. 177. 
40  Cf. ‘Binnenland’, Algemeen Handelsblad, 2 October 1900. 
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An international secret association exists in the world, with a criminal intent; 
it is time for the police forces of all countries to try to identify this organiza-
tion’s practices without delay and to mutually encourage one another to ex-
change information and investigation results. They do so already in numerous 
instances, they should do so always.41 
Given the empirical lack of real violent anarchists in the Netherlands, mostly 
socialists suffered from these new modes of control and surveillance. Enraged, 
socialist leader and representative P. J. Troelstra briefed the Dutch parliament 
on the activities of the Amsterdam Criminal Investigation Department, which 
had assembled an archive of 1500 photographic records on anarchists and 
socialists and did not feel any inhibition in sharing these with the Russian se-
cret police, the Ochrana. On the occasion of an international socialist congress 
in the Dutch capital, Amsterdam detectives had not hesitated in dispatching 
pictures and information regarding the conference’s participants to their Czarist 
colleagues (Fijnaut 2007, 354).42 In sum, although the modes of governance 
enabled and legitimized by the Dutch conspiracy dispositive did differ from the 
ones enacted by authoritarian regimes (in Prussia or Czarist Russia), and con-
stitutional infringements and public censorship were kept in close rein on an 
administrative and executive level, the levels of control, repression, surveil-
lance and monitoring activities were raised considerably. 
8.  A Final Note: The Importance of Imagining Security 
Concluding, with constitutional limitations in place, the security dispositive of 
the fight against the Black International also gained ground in the Netherlands 
from 1893 onwards. Although the Netherlands lacked a thoroughly centralized 
and authoritarian regime wielding power, metropolitan police commissioners 
and regional prosecution offices, most notably from the offices in the border 
regions, managed to prioritize anarchism as a security threat. Until 1894, this 
process of bottom-up securitization unfolded behind the scenes, within the 
police and judicial departments. At this stage, expansion of security measures 
and infringements on constitutional liberties were clearly inhibited by judicial 
and administrative constraints. Judges were not prepared to support political 
prosecution practices. Mayors claimed their local authority and rejected inter-
ventions by the Royal Marechaussee.43 The Ministry of Warfare resisted wide-
spread deployment of the military police, out of financial constraints. The 
                                                             
41  ‘De Politie en ’t Anarchisme’, De Nederlandsche Politiegids, 15, September 1900, no. 177. 
42  Acts of Parliament (Handelingen der Tweede Kamer), 1904-1906, 36th meeting, 20 Decem-
ber 1904, 885-891.  
43  Cf. NA, pl.no. 2.09.05, inv.no. 2919, letter from the Association of Mayors and Town Clerks 
in Friesland to the Minister of Justice, 23 August 1893, no. 44. 
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minister of justice moreover refused to spend money on an autonomous bomb 
squad or explosives research laboratory, and was also rather stingy in appoint-
ing more police informers and detectives. Within the Dutch system, there was 
still no place for deploying agents provocateurs as the Ochrana did. Nor was 
there enough political support for the implementation of a ‘thought police’, 
total censorship or ideologically motivated prosecution. 
However, news about attacks abroad, in France, Germany or Russia, 
reached the Dutch coffee tables through all kinds of new information and 
communication channels from 1894 onwards. And through the bottom-up 
processes of securitization within the regional police and judiciary offices, the 
fight against the Black International climbed high on the Dutch political agenda 
as well. ‘Technologies of imagination’ transformed the faraway, imagined 
threat of anarchist violence into a vivid and material danger. Police commis-
sioners assembled and disseminated wanted posters and pictures of fugitive 
anarchists, portraits parlés (identity cards containing anthropometric data) 
within the country and abroad, and assisted their foreign police colleagues 
when possible. Newspapers, telegraph, telephone and coffee house rumors 
contributed to this process of public dissemination and securitization of the 
global anarchist threat.  
Incidents in the Netherlands remained limited to the Von Ungern-Sternberg 
affair, some hoaxes and heightened anarchist activity in writing and organiza-
tion surrounding the royal visit in the summer of 1895. Notwithstanding this 
lack of ‘real’ anarchist attacks, the potential threat of the Black International 
captured both the public and political space and legitimized an acceleration of 
the already ongoing processes of modernization and professionalization of the 
police forces. From 1894/1895 (after the Von Sternberg affair and the crowning 
of Wilhelmina), classical liberal administrations launched the first attempts to 
restrict constitutional liberties. They supported the inflation of both the referent 
subject and the referent object of the threat: progressively, socialists, outsiders 
and foreigners were targeted by the new modes of security governance, and 
society’s vulnerability was accentuated. Deportation of foreigners, permanent 
surveillance and the deployment of plain-clothed detectives as a preventative 
and proactive measure became standard procedure in cases of perceived urgen-
cy and threat. In the media as in official parliamentary reports (for example by 
the Commission-Kist), the anarchist threat was equated with a subversion of 
public order and morality as such.  
In sum, even within a relatively peaceful and quiet country such as the 
Netherlands, the dispositive of the Black International provided local and na-
tional authorities with leverage to impose new modes of control and govern-
ance on society – through the use of imagination and the techniques to opera-
tionalize imagined threats.  
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Some last words on the nexus between conspiracy dispositives and the new 
technologies of imagination.44 Conspiracies need imagination; the above-
mentioned expansion of the referent subject, referent object and the rise of new 
modes of governance thrived on the visualization of danger and threat by new 
ICT means of the late 19th century. Security rests on the basis of certain imag-
es of danger, threat and destruction. In complexly networked societies, security 
needs to be communicated in order to exist. Images of security are therefore 
crucial elements of modern security dispositives. By means of new ‘technolo-
gies of imagination’, the conspiracy dispositive invoked an invisible enemy. 
For the police forces, the conspiracy concept nourished a diffuse conglomerate 
of all kinds of heterogeneous threats: ranging from socialists, reformists, com-
munists to the handful of real anarchists. For them, the conspiracy dispositive 
also offered an operational anchor. Underneath perfectly legal gatherings or 
activities, a subversive plot might be metastasizing; its members, supporters, 
geographical extension and explosive or apocalyptical means were beyond 
measurement. But not beyond imagination, and here the technologies of imagi-
nation came in useful as means of rendering the imagined threat as positively 
measurable and visible as possible: by presenting pictures, anthropometric 
coordinates, at least the suggestion of scientific policing and accurate prosecut-
ing was upheld. 
These imaginaries of threat and insecurity are intricately connected to more 
general modern social imaginaries (Taylor 2004). Much work has been done on 
the ways in which the nation is an imagined community (Anderson 1991) and 
in which societies involve an ‘imaginary constitution’ (Castoriadis 1987). Both 
Ricoeur (1986) and Taylor (2004) underscore the importance of general imagi-
naries in forming everyday life, providing meaning and order to social practice. 
(Gaonkar 2002, 4). More specifically, social imagination consists of representa-
tions (in the form of definitions, attributions, pictures, statistics, charts, graphs, 
etc.) that claim to describe (parts of) society. Thematizations of security, espe-
cially when the threat is framed as a conspiracy, take shape in the face of 
threats and dangers that cannot be fully known, measured or calculated, but that 
nonetheless involve various images of security that are closely connected to 
larger risk and security imaginaries.  
These thematizations are produced by the so-called “ocular centers of social 
life, geared specifically to the production of images of risk and security”. Ocu-
lar centers can be defined in a general sense as institutions specialized in visu-
alizing, representing or imagining social life (Schinkel 2011). Ocular centers 
have proliferated in modern times in a number of fields, ranging from monitor-
ing agencies in the fields of capital flows and quality management to evaluating 
institutions in health care and education, from audit agencies to often suprana-
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tional regulatory bodies and regimes of supervision or surveillance. Examples 
of ocular centers in the security realm are risk databases, border monitoring 
agencies and policy bodies. This is exactly what happened in the case of the 
Black International, where the securitization of the anarchist threat led to the 
construction of conspiracy theories. The techniques of visualization in the case 
of the Black International were manifold: the specter of the anarchist throwing 
bombs was multiplied by leaflets, in newspapers, distributed over the world. 
Most wanted posters were disseminated. Photographs depicting anarchists in 
various disguises and portraits parlés became popular collector’s items in 
police circles. New ocular centers (the international police conference of Rome 
1898, new investigative agencies, registration centers) were erected. The per-
formative dimensions of the risk and security images that these centers dissem-
inated in terms of legitimation and practices, in politics and policy, were enor-
mous: they legitimized the mobilization of police forces, raids, searches of 
potential anarchist hideouts. The anarchist suspect became an overwhelming 
public scare in many countries, leading to the increase of preventative measures 
against strangers, socialists or communists as such (notification orders, expul-
sion orders, surveillance measures, rendition agreements, country bans, re-
strictions on the freedom of speech, association).  
Although not all European countries went as far as the repressive laws and 
measures adopted by the Czarist regime – the Dutch government operated very 
carefully not to provide additional ammunition to the socialists, or turn them 
into martyrs –, the Black International nevertheless tied into larger, more en-
compassing discourses and risk and security imaginaries of the 19th-century 
civilized world. The social imagination of the anarchist scare was played out 
against the image of good citizenship in the context of late 19th-century norms 
and values. Thus, it accelerated the politics of disciplining chaos and radical 
opposition, legitimized new surveillance and intelligence techniques, prompted 
a metastasizing intelligence bureaucracy and launched the first international 
standardization and organization of police and intelligence cooperation. The 
dispositive of the Black International was legitimized by the construction of a 
conspiratorial view of disparate anarchist incidents, visualized by all kinds of 
new ICT methods, and fed into new modes of governance that laid the ground-
work for modern-day centralized, technology-driven, national security regimes.  
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